Dr. Richard Eells Goes to Court

The attempt by Dr. Richard Eells to liberate a Missouri slave we know only as Charley is one of the most dramatic and tragic stories in the history of Quincy and Adams County, very well described by earlier writers in this series. The events on that summer night in 1842 initiated a legal controversy lawyers, judges and historians continue to study.
After Charley swam across the Mississippi river, free Blacks in Quincy took him to Eells’s home at 415 Jersey. Eells, a conductor on the Underground Railroad, worked with Berryman Barnett and other free Blacks in Quincy, whose expertise was essential to the success of the Railroad’s Quincy branch. Later in darkness, Eells started to transport Charley to a second “station” at Quincy’s Mission Institute. Men searching for the runaway slave intercepted Eells’s wagon, captured Charley and apparently returned him to Missouri.”
We do not know Charley’s fate. On request from Charley’s owner, Justice of the Peace Henry Asbury issued a warrant charging Eells with violating Illinois law by “harboring and secreting” a slave. Supreme Court Justice Stephen A. Douglas, presiding in Adams County Circuit Court at Quincy, later tried and convicted Eells, imposing a $400 fine.
These events might have been forgotten, had Eells’s lawyers not appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court and, after his death on a steamboat crossing the Ohio river at Cincinnati, to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Quincy Whig, on January 10, 1853, recalling “Dr. Richard Eells, a highly respectable physician of this city” and his trial court conviction, summarized the proceedings and issues before the state and national tribunals.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Eells’s conviction by a divided vote. Writing the majority opinion was Justice James Shields, a former Illinois state auditor, who once challenged his fellow Springfield lawyer, Abraham Lincoln, to a duel. Mary Todd and a friend had published anonymous satirical verses about Shields and he demanded to know their identities. Lincoln, to protect the women, claimed authorship, and Shields called for combat with broadswords. Intervention by friends of both men prevented what might have been a disaster for American history.
Opposing Shields, the Whig noted, three jurists, including Chief Justice William Wilson, joined a dissenting opinion by Justice Samuel Lockwood. A central issue in the case was the constitutionality of the Illinois law under which Eells had been charged. That statute mirrored the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which authorized slave owners, or those working with them, to seize a runaway slave and bring that person before a judge. Once presented with testimony that the person seized was a runaway slave, the law required the judge to issue a certificate permitting return of the person to the state or territory from which he/she had fled.
Before the Civil War, many states prohibited slaves—and often free Black witnesses—from testifying in court, especially if the testimony would contradict that of a white witness. Consequently, the person seized and brought before a judge might not be allowed to prove that he/she was not a runaway. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 ended this discrimination by providing that Blacks could “give evidence” in court proceedings.
Eells’s appellate lawyers argued that the Illinois law, under which the state prosecuted him, was unconstitutional because the federal Fugitive Slave Act had preempted the right of states to enact similar laws. Justice Shields rejected that contention and held that the Illinois law was a permissible “police regulation” which any state could impose. Justice Lockwood replied that earlier U.S. Supreme Court precedent held that the 1793 law superseded and prohibited separate state laws on fugitive slaves. He added that under the Illinois constitution of 1818: “… all men, whether black or white, are, in this state, presumed to be free, and that every person who claims another to be his slave, under any exception or limitation of the general rule, must clearly show that the person so claimed comes within such exception.”
The further appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States saw Ohio Senator Salmon P. Chase, prominent abolitionist and future Chief Justice, appearing for Eells’s estate against former Justice Shields (now a Senator from Illinois) arguing to uphold the judgment in which he had written the majority opinion. Legal and congressional ethics in the nineteenth century allowed Senators to engage in the outside practice of law before federal jurists whose salaries and professional responsibilities were set by those same legislators.
The Whig noted a paradox in Chase’s legal argument to the Court: “It was a singular feature in this case, that Mr. Chase was obliged to assume a position antagonistic to his political views. He, and we believe most of the ‘Free Democracy’ hold that the power to legislate on the subject of fugitives, from service is not in Congress at all, but exclusively in the State Legislatures. He alluded to this apparent inconsistency in his argument, but said that he should claim as a lawyer” the benefit of litigation contrary to his personal beliefs if it supported his client’s position.
Eight justices voted to uphold the Illinois law as a permissible police regulation. Only Justice John McClean, known to be anti-slavery, dissented, arguing that earlier precedent and the risk that a defendant prosecuted under such state laws might face duplicative federal prosecution, required invalidation of the Illinois law.
Readers today may ask (1) why did Eells’s death not automatically end (moot) the case and (2) why did such a prominent figure as Chase enter a case he was likely to lose at such a late stage? Perhaps both legal and political considerations provide answers. First, despite Eells’s death, his estate technically remained liable for the $400 fine Justice Douglas had imposed at the Quincy trial. Second, Chase and the abolitionists may have seen political advantages in the public outrage elicited by Eells’s case, even if success in court was uncertain. The honor Quincy has accorded Eells’s modest home as a preserved historic site suggests that they were right.
SOURCES
Avins, Alfred, “The Right to Be a Witness and the Fourteenth Amendment”, Missouri Law Review, Fall, 1966, pp. 471-504.
Bangert, Heather, “Black Abolitionist Network Grew with the City”, Herald Whig (Jan. 11, 2015).
Caselaw Access Project, https://cite.case.law/ill/5/497/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
“Decision in Dr. Eell’s [ sic ] Case.” The Quincy Whig , Jan. 10, 1853, p. 1
Donald, David, “The Folklore Lincoln,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society , (Dec., 1947), pp. 377-396.
Eells v People of the State of Illinois , 5 Ill. 497 (1843) (decision of Illinois Supreme Court).
Findlaw, https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/55/13.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
McGinley, Patrick, “Eells House Connects Town with Underground Railroad”, Herald Whig, (September 11, 2011).
Moore v People of the State of Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 (1852) (decision of U.S. Supreme Court).
Because of Dr. Eells death, the case caption substitutes “Moore” as executor of the estate for “Eells”).





